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I. Domestic Legislation

1. MLA Laws

The United States authorizes MLA per the law 28 USC 1782. The complete law is as follows: 

28 USC 1782 - Assistance to foreign and international tribunals and to litigants before such tribunals

• (a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation. The order may be made pursuant to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by a foreign or international tribunal or upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, before a person appointed by the court. By virtue of his appointment, the person appointed has power to administer any necessary oath and take the testimony or statement. The order may prescribe the practice and procedure, which may be in whole or part the practice and procedure of the foreign country or the international tribunal, for taking the testimony or statement or producing the document or other thing. To the extent that the order does not prescribe otherwise, the testimony or statement shall be taken, and the document or other thing produced, in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
  A person may not be compelled to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.

• (b) This chapter does not preclude a person within the United States from voluntarily giving his testimony or statement, or producing a document or other thing, for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal before any person and in any manner acceptable to him.

II. Bilateral Treaties

The United States has in excess of 60 bilateral or Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) for use in obtaining and exchanging evidence in criminal matter. A list of these treaties can be found at the website http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/judicial_690.html

Country	Entered Into Force (or signed, not yet in force, where noted)	Citations
Antigua and Barbuda	July 1, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-24 105th Cong., 1st Sess. Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Argentina	February 9, 1993	Treaty Doc. 102-18, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 102-33, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
Australia	September 30, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-27, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Austria	August 1, 1998	Treaty Doc. 104-21, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 104-24, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Bahamas	July 18, 1990	Treaty Doc. 100-17, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept. 100-30, 100th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Barbados	March 3, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-23, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess
Belize	January 7, 2003	Treaty Doc. 107-13 U.S. Belize MLAT Press Release
Belgium	January 1, 2000	Treaty Doc. 100-16, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept. 100-29, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. Exec. Rept. 101-11, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
Brazil	February 21, 2001	Treaty Doc. 105-42 105th Cong. 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept 105-22, 105th Cong, 2nd Sess.
Canada	January 24, 1990	Treaty Doc. 100-14; 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept. 100-28; 100th Cong, 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept 101-10; 101st Cong., 1st Sess. XXIV ILM No. 4, 7/85, 1092-1099. Canada Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (OAS) Canadian Central Authorities (RCMP) MLATs:  Investigator's Guide to Seeking Assistance Through the Department of Justice (RCMP) Alternative Approaches to Combating Transnational Crime
Colombia	Signed August 20, 1980 (Not in Force)	Treaty Doc. 97-11, 97th Cong. 1st Sess. Exec Rept 97-35
Cyprus	September 18, 2002	Treaty Doc. 106-35, 106 Cong. 2nd Sess. Exec. Rept 106-24, 106 Cong. 2nd Sess.
Czech Republic	May 7, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-47, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Dominica	May 25, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-24, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22; 105th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Egypt	November 29, 2001	Treaty Doc. 106-19, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept. 106-24, 106th Cong, 2nd Sess.
Estonia	October 20, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-52, 105th Cong., 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong. 2nd Sess.
European Union	Signed June 25, 2003 (Not in Force)	Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance Between European Union and United States of America (EU site) U.S. Signs Pacts With Three European Nations U.S. Mission to EU - U.S. Signs Accords with Sweden, Finland, Belgium
Finland	Signed December 16, 2004 (Not in Force)
France	December 1, 2001	Treaty Doc. 106-17, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept 106-24, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess.
Germany	Signed October 14, 2003 (Not in Force)
Greece	November 20, 2001	Treaty Doc. 106-18, 106th Cong. 2nd Sess., Exec. Rept. 106-24, 106th Cong, 2d Sess.
Grenada	September 14, 1999	Treaty Doc. 15-24, 105th Cong. 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Hong Kong SAR	January 21, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-6 , 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22; 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Hungary	March 18, 1997	Treaty Doc. 104-20, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. Exec Rept. 104-25, 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
India	October 3, 2005	Treaty Doc. 107-3 , 107th Cong., 2d Sess.
Ireland	Signed January 18,2001 (Not in Force)	Treaty Doc. 107-9, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.
Israel	May 25, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-40, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Italy	November 13, 1985	Sen. Ex. 98-25, Exec. Rept. 98-36, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
Jamaica	July 25, 1995	Treaty Doc. 102-16, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 102-32, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
Japan	Signed August 5, 2003 (Not in Force)	Treaty Doc. 108-12. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Signing of MLAT with United States
Korea	May 23, 1997	Treaty Doc. 104-1, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 104-22; 104th Cong. 2d Sess.
Latvia	September 17, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-34, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22; 105th Cong., 2nd Sess.
Liechtenstein	August 1, 2003	Treaty Doc. 107-16
Lithuania	August 26, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-41, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. U.S. Lithuania Sign Extradition MLAT Accords (June 5, 2005)
Luxembourg	February 1, 2001	Treaty Doc. 105-11, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Mexico	May 3, 1991	Treaty Doc. 100-13, Exec. Rept. 100-27, 100th Cong., 2 Sess., Exec. Rept. 101-09, 101st Cong. 1st Sess., XXVII ILM, No. 2, 3/88, 447.
Morocco	June 23, 1993	Sen. Ex. 98-24, Exec. Rept. 98-35, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
Netherlands	September 15, 1983	TIAS 10734
Panama	September 6, 1995	Treaty Doc. 102-15, 102 Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 104-3, 102 Cong., 2d Sess.
Philippines	November 22, 1996	Treaty Doc. 104-18, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 104-26, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. Treaty With the Philippines on MLAT
Poland	September 17, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-12, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Romania	October 17, 2001	Treaty Doc. 106-20, 106th Cong. 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 106-24, 106th Cont, 2d Sess.
Russian Federation		Fact Sheet Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Between the U.S. and Russia January 31, 2002 DOJ Overseas Prosecutorial Development
Saint Kitts & Nevis	February 23, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-37, Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Saint Lucia	February 2, 2000	Treaty Doc. 105-24, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22; 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
Saint Vincent & the Grenadines	September 8, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-44, Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.
South Africa	June 25, 2001	Treaty Doc. 106-36, 106th Cong., 2d Sess. Exec. Rept. 106-24, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. South Africa Department of Justice, MLATs
Spain	June 30, 1993	Treaty Doc. 102-21, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 102-35, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
Sweden	Signed December 17, 2001 (Not in Force)	Treaty Doc. 107-12, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. U.S. - Swedish MLAT
Switzerland	January 23, 1977	TIAS 8302, 27 UST 2019 Swiss Division for International Legal Assistance Swiss MLAT Fact Sheet U.S. Embassy Bern Judicial Assistance Criminal Matters
Thailand	June 10, 1993	Treaty Doc. 100-18, Exec. Rept. 100-31, 100th Cong., 3d Sess., Exec. Rept. 101-13, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
Trinidad and Tobago	November 29, 1999	Treaty Doc. 105-22, 105th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters In Trinidad and Tobago (OAS)
Turkey	January 1, 1981	TIAS 9891
United Kingdom	December 2, 1996	Treaty Doc. 104-2, 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 104-23, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. Foreign and Commonwealth Office MLATs
United Kingdom (Cayman Islands)	March 19, 1990	Treaty Doc. 100-8; 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 100-26, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 100-26; 100th Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 101-8, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., XXVI ILM 536, 3/87.
United Kingdom (Anguilla)	November 9, 1990	Treaty with U.K. on Cayman Islands extended to Anguilla.
United Kingdom (British Virgin Islands)	November 9, 1990	Treaty with U.K. on Cayman Islands extended to British Virgin Islands.
United Kingdom (Montserrat)	April 26, 1991	Treaty with U.K. on Cayman Islands extended to Montserrat.
United Kingdom (Turks and Caicos Islands)	November 9, 1990	Treaty with U.K. on Cayman Islands extended to Turks and Caicos.
Uruguay	April 15, 1994	Treaty Doc. 102-19, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., Exec. Rept. 102-34, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
Venezuela	Signed October 12, 1997 (Not in Force)	Treaty Doc. 105-38, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Exec. Rept. 105-22, 105th Cong., 2d Sess.

 

III. Regional Treaties

The United States is a member of the Organization of American States (OAS) "Information Exchange Network for Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and Extradition", see website http://www.oas.org/JURIDICO/MLA/en/usa/#multi

III. International Treaties

1. UNCAC

Signatory; the United States ratified the UNCAC on October 30, 2006

UNCAC establishes that mutual legal assistance can be used, apart from the traditional purposes, for the recovery of assets, in accordance with chapter V of the convention. Asset recovery is in fact one of the key principles of this instrument. On article 54, specifically, it refers to the mechanisms for recovery of property through international cooperation in confiscation. The competent authorities of a requested State Party must be able to give effect to an order of confiscation issued by a court of another state party or to order the confiscation itself. This is done through mutual legal assistance requests or letter rogatories.

The convention establishes the need for a central authority to be set up in every country. However, once the request reaches the central authority it is normally handed to a prosecutor for execution. The prosecutor will send the correspondent requests to the judge with the objective of obtaining the pertinent orders. This would be the prosecutor's first role in enforcing foreign judgments in their national jurisdictions.

The mutual legal assistance request is subject to a series of formalities, according to article 15 of UNCAC. It must clearly establish the identity of the authority making the request and the subject matter and nature of the investigation. It should also contain a summary of the relevant facts and a description of the assistance sought. It must also mention the identity of the people involved. Finally, it should establish the purpose for which the information will be used. The letter of request must be sent in a language acceptable to the authorities of the requested party. The lack of any of these requirements is reason enough to refuse assistance.

2. UNTOC 

The United States ratified the UNTOC on October 19, 2005.

As criminals themselves have started to operate regionally and even more spread out around the globe, national jurisdictions must understand the need to cooperate and work together in order to prevent becoming a hiding place for ill gotten profits as well as to be able to trace and retrieve moneys that have been maliciously stolen from them. This can only be achieved through international legal assistance, which is strongly emphasized by the UNTOC.

On article 18 this convention enumerates a wide range of examples of information that may be accessed through mutual legal assistance (MLA). The catalog is practically unlimited. Through MLA it is possible to collect documentary evidence; statements of persons (which, if are reflected on police reports could be later incorporated in trial even in the most accusatory of systems); effect service of judicial documents; execute searches, seizures and freezing of assets; examination of objects and sites; obtain expert evaluations; or, as UNTOC itself words it, "any other type of assistance that is not contrary to the domestic law of the requested State Party".

Furthermore, it establishes the need to create a central authority to process all the MLAs received from State Parties. It is important for the requesting parties to keep in mind that the MLA must be submitted "in a language acceptable to the requesting State Party", which should normally be one of the official languages of the concerned country. The document must always identify the authority making the request; the nature of the investigation; a brief summary of all the relevant facts; a detail of the assistance sought; the identity, location and nationality of any person concerned and the purpose for which the evidence is required. The lack of any of these formalities allows the requested party to refuse rendering help.

3. OECD Anti-Bribery Convention

The United States ratified this OECD convention on December 8, 1998.

a) Commentaries on the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery

The following commentaries are taken from the OECD web page at http://www.oecd.org/document/1/0,3343,en_2649_34859_2048129_1_1_1_1,00.html. 

1. This Convention deals with what, in the law of some countries, is called "active corruption" or "active bribery", meaning the offence committed by the person who promises or gives the bribe, as contrasted with "passive bribery", the offence committed by the official who receives the bribe. The Convention does not utilise the term "active bribery" simply to avoid it being misread by the non-technical reader as implying that the briber has taken the initiative and the recipient is a passive victim. In fact, in a number of situations, the recipient will have induced or pressured the briber and will have been, in that sense, the more active.

2. This Convention seeks to assure a functional equivalence among the measures taken by the Parties to sanction bribery of foreign public officials, without requiring uniformity or changes in fundamental principles of a Party's legal system. 

i) Article 1. The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials:

Re paragraph 1:

3. Article 1 establishes a standard to be met by Parties, but does not require them to utilise its precise terms in defining the offence under their domestic laws. A Party may use various approaches to fulfil its obligations, provided that conviction of a person for the offence does not require proof of elements beyond those which would be required to be proved if the offence were defined as in this paragraph. For example, a statute prohibiting the bribery of agents generally which does not specifically address bribery of a foreign public official, and a statute specifically limited to this case, could both comply with this Article. Similarly, a statute which defined the offence in terms of payments "to induce a breach of the official's duty" could meet the standard provided that it was understood that every public official had a duty to exercise judgement or discretion impartially and this was an "autonomous" definition not requiring proof of the law of the particular official's country.

4. It is an offence within the meaning of paragraph 1 to bribe to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage whether or not the company concerned was the best qualified bidder or was otherwise a company which could properly have been awarded the business.

5. "Other improper advantage" refers to something to which the company concerned was not clearly entitled, for example, an operating permit for a factory which fails to meet the statutory requirements.

6. The conduct described in paragraph 1 is an offence whether the offer or promise is made or the pecuniary or other advantage is given on that person's own behalf or on behalf of any other natural person or legal entity.

7. It is also an offence irrespective of, inter alia, the value of the advantage, its results, perceptions of local custom, the tolerance of such payments by local authorities, or the alleged necessity of the payment in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage.

8. It is not an offence, however, if the advantage was permitted or required by the written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country, including case law.

9. Small "facilitation" payments do not constitute payments made "to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage" within the meaning of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not an offence. Such payments, which, in some countries, are made to induce public officials to perform their functions, such as issuing licenses or permits, are generally illegal in the foreign country concerned. Other countries can and should address this corrosive phenomenon by such means as support for programmes of good governance. However, criminalisation by other countries does not seem a practical or effective complementary action.

10. Under the legal system of some countries, an advantage promised or given to any person, in anticipation of his or her becoming a foreign public official, falls within the scope of the offences described in Article 1, paragraph 1 or 2. Under the legal system of many countries, it is considered technically distinct from the offences covered by the present Convention. However, there is a commonly shared concern and intent to address this phenomenon through further work.

Re paragraph 2:

11. The offences set out in paragraph 2 are understood in terms of their normal content in national legal systems. Accordingly, if authorisation, incitement, or one of the other listed acts, which does not lead to further action, is not itself punishable under a Party's legal system, then the Party would not be required to make it punishable with respect to bribery of a foreign public official.

Re paragraph 4:

12. "Public function" includes any activity in the public interest, delegated by a foreign country, such as the performance of a task delegated by it in connection with public procurement.

13. A "public agency" is an entity constituted under public law to carry out specific tasks in the public interest.

14. A "public enterprise" is any enterprise, regardless of its legal form, over which a government, or governments, may, directly or indirectly, exercise a dominant influence. This is deemed to be the case, inter alia, when the government or governments hold the majority of the enterprise's subscribed capital, control the majority of votes attaching to shares issued by the enterprise or can appoint a majority of the members of the enterprise's administrative or managerial body or supervisory board.

15. An official of a public enterprise shall be deemed to perform a public function unless the enterprise operates on a normal commercial basis in the relevant market, i.e., on a basis which is substantially equivalent to that of a private enterprise, without preferential subsidies or other privileges.

16. In special circumstances, public authority may in fact be held by persons (e.g., political party officials in single party states) not formally designated as public officials. Such persons, through their de facto performance of a public function, may, under the legal principles of some countries, be considered to be foreign public officials.

17. "Public international organisation" includes any international organisation formed by states, governments, or other public international organisations, whatever the form of organisation and scope of competence, including, for example, a regional economic integration organisation such as the European Communities.

18. "Foreign country" is not limited to states, but includes any organised foreign area or entity, such as an autonomous territory or a separate customs territory.

19. One case of bribery which has been contemplated under the definition in paragraph 4.c is where an executive of a company gives a bribe to a senior official of a government, in order that this official use his office -- though acting outside his competence -- to make another official award a contract to that company.

ii) Article 2. Responsibility of Legal Persons:

20. In the event that, under the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall not be required to establish such criminal responsibility.

iii) Article 3. Sanctions:

Re paragraph 3:

21. The "proceeds" of bribery are the profits or other benefits derived by the briber from the transaction or other improper advantage obtained or retained through bribery.

22. The term "confiscation" includes forfeiture where applicable and means the permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent authority. This paragraph is without prejudice to rights of victims.

23. Paragraph 3 does not preclude setting appropriate limits to monetary sanctions.

Re paragraph 4:

24. Among the civil or administrative sanctions, other than non-criminal fines, which might be imposed upon legal persons for an act of bribery of a foreign public official are: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; temporary or permanent disqualification from participation in public procurement or from the practice of other commercial activities; placing under judicial supervision; and a judicial winding-up order.

iv) Article 4. Jurisdiction:

Re paragraph 1:

25. The territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required.

Re paragraph 2:

26. Nationality jurisdiction is to be established according to the general principles and conditions in the legal system of each Party. These principles deal with such matters as dual criminality. However, the requirement of dual criminality should be deemed to be met if the act is unlawful where it occurred, even if under a different criminal statute. For countries which apply nationality jurisdiction only to certain types of offences, the reference to "principles" includes the principles upon which such selection is based.

v) Article 5. Enforcement:

27. Article 5 recognises the fundamental nature of national regimes of prosecutorial discretion. It recognises as well that, in order to protect the independence of prosecution, such discretion is to be exercised on the basis of professional motives and is not to be subject to improper influence by concerns of a political nature. Article 5 is complemented by paragraph 6 of the Annex to the 1997 OECD Revised Recommendation on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions, C(97)123/FINAL (hereinafter, "1997 OECD Recommendation"), which recommends, inter alia, that complaints of bribery of foreign public officials should be seriously investigated by competent authorities and that adequate resources should be provided by national governments to permit effective prosecution of such bribery. Parties will have accepted this Recommendation, including its monitoring and follow-up arrangements.

vi) Article 7. Money Laundering:

28. In Article 7, "bribery of its own public official" is intended broadly, so that bribery of a foreign public official is to be made a predicate offence for money laundering legislation on the same terms, when a Party has made either active or passive bribery of its own public official such an offence. When a Party has made only passive bribery of its own public officials a predicate offence for money laundering purposes, this article requires that the laundering of the bribe payment be subject to money laundering legislation.

vii) Article 8. Accounting:

29. Article 8 is related to section V of the 1997 OECD Recommendation, which all Parties will have accepted and which is subject to follow-up in the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions. This paragraph contains a series of recommendations concerning accounting requirements, independent external audit and internal company controls the implementation of which will be important to the overall effectiveness of the fight against bribery in international business. However, one immediate consequence of the implementation of this Convention by the Parties will be that companies which are required to issue financial statements disclosing their material contingent liabilities will need to take into account the full potential liabilities under this Convention, in particular its Articles 3 and 8, as well as other losses which might flow from conviction of the company or its agents for bribery. This also has implications for the execution of professional responsibilities of auditors regarding indications of bribery of foreign public officials. In addition, the accounting offences referred to in Article 8 will generally occur in the company's home country, when the bribery offence itself may have been committed in another country, and this can fill gaps in the effective reach of the Convention.

viii) Article 9. Mutual Legal Assistance:

30. Parties will have also accepted, through paragraph 8 of the Agreed Common Elements annexed to the 1997 OECD Recommendation, to explore and undertake means to improve the efficiency of mutual legal assistance.

Re paragraph 1:

31. Within the framework of paragraph 1 of Article 9, Parties should, upon request, facilitate or encourage the presence or availability of persons, including persons in custody, who consent to assist in investigations or participate in proceedings. Parties should take measures to be able, in appropriate cases, to transfer temporarily such a person in custody to a Party requesting it and to credit time in custody in the requesting Party to the transferred person's sentence in the requested Party. The Parties wishing to use this mechanism should also take measures to be able, as a requesting Party, to keep a transferred person in custody and return this person without necessity of extradition proceedings.

Re paragraph 2:

32. Paragraph 2 addresses the issue of identity of norms in the concept of dual criminality. Parties with statutes as diverse as a statute prohibiting the bribery of agents generally and a statute directed specifically at bribery of foreign public officials should be able to co-operate fully regarding cases whose facts fall within the scope of the offences described in this Convention.

ix) Article 10. Extradition:

Re paragraph 2:

33. A Party may consider this Convention to be a legal basis for extradition if, for one or more categories of cases falling within this Convention, it requires an extradition treaty. For example, a country may consider it a basis for extradition of its nationals if it requires an extradition treaty for that category but does not require one for extradition of non-nationals.

x) Article 12. Monitoring and Follow-up:

34. The current terms of reference of the OECD Working Group on Bribery which are relevant to monitoring and follow-up are set out in Section VIII of the 1997 OECD Recommendation. They provide for:

i) receipt of notifications and other information submitted to it by the [participating] countries;

ii) regular reviews of steps taken by [participating] countries to implement the Recommendation and to make proposals, as appropriate, to assist [participating] countries in its implementation; these reviews will be based on the following complementary systems:

• a system of self evaluation, where [participating] countries' responses on the basis of a questionnaire will provide a basis for assessing the implementation of the Recommendation;
• a system of mutual evaluation, where each [participating] country will be examined in turn by the Working Group on Bribery, on the basis of a report which will provide an objective assessment of the progress of the [participating] country in implementing the Recommendation.

iii) examination of specific issues relating to bribery in international business transactions;

...

v) provision of regular information to the public on its work and activities and on implementation of the Recommendation.

35. The costs of monitoring and follow-up will, for OECD Members, be handled through the normal OECD budget process. For non-members of the OECD, the current rules create an equivalent system of cost sharing, which is described in the Resolution of the Council Concerning Fees for Regular Observer Countries and Non-Member Full Participants in OECD Subsidiary Bodies, C(96)223/FINAL.

36. The follow-up of any aspect of the Convention which is not also follow-up of the 1997 OECD Recommendation or any other instrument accepted by all the participants in the OECD Working Group on Bribery will be carried out by the Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, the participants party to another, corresponding instrument.